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1. Introduction 
 
Our paper is on commercial farming and agribusiness in South Africa and their changing 
roles in Africa’s agro-food system, as a response to debates and theoretical propositions about 
internal agrarian change in BRICS countries and their relations with other middle-income 
countries and the old hubs of capital. 
 
South Africa is of course an outlier among the BRICS group of countries, given its far 
smaller economy, and was included only in 2010, as the only candidate that could be seen as 
economically and politically dominant in Africa – though by last year, Nigeria had overtaken 
South Africa as the largest economy in Africa.  
 
BRICS countries as regional hegemons / imperialist / sub-imperialist 
 
Adebajo and Landsberg (2003) have argued that South Africa and Nigeria have emerged in 
the post cold war period as ‘regional hegemons’ in Southern and West Africa respectively. 
But such characterisations hinge on an international relations perspective focusing on states, 
conflict and diplomacy, rather than our concern here, which is about political economy in 
relation to agro-food systems – in which the state is implicated but not a useful unit of 
analysis. 
  
A related debate is whether South Africa, economically, is an imperial power, or a sub-
imperial power in alliance with global capital. We aim to address this, within the BICAS 
research agenda, by asking: in what ways have agrarian and agro-food transformations in 
South Africa itself, located within its economy as a whole, conditioned the manner in which 
capitals throughout the value chain and associated industries are engaging with the rest of the 
continent? 
 
2. Our argument 
 
We present an argument about path dependency. In the context of agrarian change and agro-
food transformation, our arugment is not about path dependency in relation to a growth path, 
but rather in relation to a path of accumulation. 
 
South Africa’s economy is centred on what has been termed a ‘mineral-energy complex’ as a 
particular form of capitalism and a system of capital accumulation that underpinned and 
continues to underpin transformations in the democratic era. Composed of private mining 
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conglomerates and state corporations in electricity and steel, these sectors established a path 
of development in which a highly developed capitalist economy was constructed in the 
absence of a substantial manufacturing base – ‘a partial vacuum of intermediate and capital 
goods capability, a failure to accrue economies of scale and scope other than in core MEC 
sectors, and an inefficient consumer goods industry surviving by protection upon demand. 
Agriculture tells a similar, although not identical, story’ (Fine 2008: 2).  
 
We draw attention to the character of the overall SA economy – its transformations and some 
enduring underpinning features – which condition the manner in which South African 
capitals have been and continue to explore new investment frontiers regionally within Africa 
and beyond. This character is founded on the contrast between ‘South Africa’s continuing 
first world corporate capitalism and the third world conditions most citizens live in [which] 
are both to a significant extent a product of postapartheid government’ – rather than, as is 
often thought, and as much policy thinking presumes, merely a lingering legacy of apartheid 
(Hart and Padayachee 2013: 56). It is a dualism being produced and reproduced in more 
profound and entrenched ways, a matter evident in growing inequality even alongside a 
decline in absolute poverty (ref). One of the persistent features of South Africa’s political 
economy, under apartheid and under democracy, is the ‘high level of inequality, mirrored in 
the rising share of income appropriated by the rich’, a trend transcending political change 
(Pons-Vignon and Segatti 2013: 507-509). 
 
We locate this within food regime analysis, which characterises historical transformations in 
where, how and by whom which food is produced, and where, how and by whom which food 
is consumed. For the purposes of this paper, we attend to where, how and by whom which 
food is produced by South African people and companies, including the more tangential but 
perhaps more illuminating question of how South African-connected capital is reshaping food 
production, processing, retail and consumption in Africa. 
 
3. South Africa’s evolving agrarian structure (BC) 
 
History 
 
Unlike other societies where capitalist agriculture emerged on the American path of 
accumulation from below, in South Africa the successful capitalist white farming class was 
born of state regulation and subsidy, made possible through the minerals revolution. The 
political economy of the 20th century was shaped by competition between capitals – mining, 
energy, industry and agriculture – and from the 1970s the growth of the financial sector, with 
each deeply embedded in the state through a variety of mechanisms. 
 
From the 1913 Natives Land Act to the formalisation of native reserves as Bantustans or 
‘homelands’, state policy pursued the imperative of making available cheap labour to drive 
accumulation in the mining, industrial and agricultural sectors. The corollary was a massive 
programme of state-engineered capitalisation of white commercial farming, the centrepiece 
of the National Party’s platform of apartheid or ‘apartness’ in the 1948 general election, and 
the construction over time of a complex architecture of state regulation, subsidies, and single-
channel marketing of commodities through monopsonistic state ‘control’ boards.  
 
The financialisation of the 1970s and the economic and political crises of the 1980s set in 
place dynamics that continue to play out under a liberalised economic regime. 
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In the midst of political transition towards democracy, it was not just capital and the state that 
reached accommodation, but there was also accommodation with labour – with real benefits 
for the narrow stratum of organised labour. At the same time, SA has a ‘distributional 
regime’ of social grants, which provides for a degree of stability in an otherwise untentable 
situation of inequality. In this sense, South African economic policy cannot be simply 
described as neoliberal, but the mounting challenge to the state is how to continue to fund this 
distributional regime in a context of economic stagnation – a crisis of accumulation.  
 
The continued dominant position of the minerals-energy complex, at the core of South 
Africa’s economy, has been made possible by the rise of financial capital and financialisation 
more generally in the economy (Ashman, Fine and Newman 2011). The policy reforms of the 
1990s failed to redress the structural imbalance towards the MEC and to broaden ownership 
of the economy – this was not merely a disappointing development failure, but rather 
represented neoliberal deepening (despite the distributional regime). Here, neoliberalism is 
understood as ‘policies, ideology and practice which… reinforce the power of capital at the 
expense of labour, and the power of finance capital at the expense of other fractions of 
capital’ – and with the active support of the state in the service of capital (Pons-Vignon and 
Segatti 2013: 509). 
 
Deregulation & liberalisation in agriculture 
 
The reason why there was real protection and support for agriculture under apartheid, was a 
significant rural Afrikaner constituency – a concern to resolve the ‘poor white problem’ 
underpinned apartheid policies but became fiscally unsustainable for an apartheid state less 
dependent on the rural Afrikaner vote and by the 1980s verging on bankruptcy, prompting the 
start of deregulation and liberalisation (from early 1980s, and more sharply after 1994).  
 
Shifts in ownership patterns and production systems (new crops, technologies)  
 
The net effects in agriculture were concentration (expansion through internal accumulation) 
as well as centralisation (buying out competitors), reversing the broad base of white 
commercial farming and allowing larger companies to expand operations and landholdings as 
the number of commercial farming units dropped precipitously from about 60,000 in 1996 to 
around 35,000 in 2014.  
 
Labour regimes 
 
At the same time, despite the introduction for the first time of agricultural labour regulation, 
in the form of basic labour rights and tenure rights for farm workers and their families living 
on farms, labour regimes in agriculture have moved towards smaller, more highly-skilled, 
largely male, on-farm workforces, as changes to production systems and a massive expulsion 
of labour, led to a massive displacement of farm workers and dwellers – possibly 3 million 
since the start of democracy – and an inversion of permanent to temporary workers, with 
growing casualisation and labour brokering. This has meant the creation of an increasingly 
off-farm, casual labour force, especially in the core sector of horticulture – a footloose 
workforce of people in informal settlements dotted around farming districts – a central 
feature of what Bernstein refers to a ‘fragmented classes of labour’. 
 
Big Food 
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Deregulation, especially the closure of marketing boards and privatisation of sectoral 
cooperatives, facilitated vertical integration, leading to ‘Big Food’ – the growing dominance 
of just a handful of powerful corporations – in inputs, processing and retail, and to a lesser 
degree in primary production – alongside financialisation, the key moment in which was the 
creation of a futures market (SAFEX) in key staple commodities. While financialisation is 
global, in South Africa it was clearly a response to falling rates of profit, underpinned by 
liberalisation, and South African capitals responding to a wider set of opportunities and 
pressures in the global capitalist economy. 
 
Competition Commission 
 
Contrary to the predictions of the World Bank, whose proposals for Rural Restructuring 
informed the deregulation plan of the 1990s, these policy reforms neither lowered barriers to 
entry for small farmers, nor lowered the price of food – food price inflation has been far 
exceeding general inflation, not only due to the widespread collusion and cartels in key 
sectors – notably fertiliser, seed, poultry, milling, bread and retail – but due to the 
concentrated structure of the food system itself, and its industrial farming models premised 
on input- and capital-intensive production. State responses are not to confront big capital but 
in practice to accommodate and even support it – despite the creation of a Competition 
Commission that within a limited mandate investigates anti-competitive behaviour. This is 
entirely consistent between agriculture and other sectors of the economy (inputs industry, 
processing, retail), where structural barriers to entry have been maintained and entrenched. 
 
Indeed, the South African state appears to assume that capitalist agriculture will produce 
cheap food – despite the evidence – hence the unwillingness to actually move against them. 
ANC is supportive of large-scale commercial agriculture, and deals only with ‘distortions’ 
through cartel behaviour and its influence on pricing, but not the fundamentals of the 
structure of the economy, and of capitalist agriculture.  
 
Land reform hijacked 
 
In this context, the introduction of a modest land reform programme to transfer 30% of 
commercial farmland in the first five years of democracy, and based on a willing buyer, 
willing seller approach, with the objective of providing opportunities for the expansion of 
family-based smallholder agriculture, has morphed over the past 20 years into something 
quite different. Instead, we see a less-than-half-hearted attempt to direct limited resources 
(less than 0.5% of the national budget) towards enabling a narrow stratum of black 
commercial farmers – often urban businesspeople – to form joint ventures with agribusiness. 
In a growing proportion of cases, black people neither get rights to land, nor control how it is 
used, but rather serve as shareholders in corporate enterprises. This is land reform hijacked 
from its original purpose of challenging the structure of land ownership and control, and its 
resulting pattern of accumulation, and in a sense its normalisation within this political 
economy.  
   
 
4. South African capital’s regional footprint 
 
So, spurred by rapid deregulation and liberalisation, the overall trajectory of agrarian change 
in South Africa over the past two decades has seen – rather than land or agrarian reform – the 
consolidation of the hegemony of large-scale commercial farming and corporate agri-
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business in agricultural value chains. We are interested in how these internal conditions and 
configurations shape regional strategies.  
 
In a context of constrained domestic demand due to high levels of poverty, and emerging 
opportunities for geographic diversification, both farming and agribusiness capitals are now 
expanding into African countries. In doing so, they are promoting agro-food systems centred, 
as in South Africa, on the dominance of large capital. This is evident in six elements of the 
changing agro-food system which we discuss briefly. 
 
4.1. Financialisation and farmland funds 
 
First is the financialisation of agriculture and the emergence of South African-based 
‘farmland funds’. 
 
A growing cast of actors through whom transnational private capital is being brought into 
Africa’s agriculture, ranging from pension funds, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, 
banking institutions and agribusinesses and private equity funds which the ‘Vultures of Land 
Grabbing’ report characterized as “not only [having] a speculative business model, but also 
represent[ing] a conveyor belt for shareholder capitalism from the financial to the real 
economy.” 
 
Emergent Asset Management Ltd is a UK/SA management firm, emerging from defense and 
high-tech industries in the US, now specialising in farmland investments in Africa, with its 
African Agricultural Investment Fund established in 2008 promising 30% returns, and 
partnering with Grainvest, one of the top 5 companies on the futures exchange, to form 
operating company Emvest Agricultural Corporation, providing a vehicle for South African, 
UK and other investors to diversify their investments into African agriculture in Angola, 
Botswana, DRC, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe (it’s a quote McNellis 2009: 13). 
 
More ‘homegrown’ is the UFF Agri Asset Management, part of Old Mutual’s African 
Agricultural Fund, which aims to take ‘advantage of Africa’s enormous untapped agricultural 
potential’ (UFF 2015) through twin funds – one for internal acquisitions through 
Futuregrowth Agri-Fund (SA) and its African Agricultural Fund, enabling South African 
investors to channel investments both internally and externally in the region. Then there’s a 
variety of others, with a range of internal and regional foci, including Phatisa and others 
(Ward will discuss). 
 
4.2. Finance (more traditional forms) – banks, Afgri, investment forums etc 
 
Second, there are the more traditional forms of finance, both private and state. 
 
Among these are Standard Bank1 and ABSA, themselves transnationalised. From the 
agribusiness sector is Afgri, a privatised state-established farming cooperative, Oos-
Transvaal Beperk (OTK), which has through absorbing other former cooperatives, reinvented 
                                                             1 Standard Bank now also operates in Angola, Botswana, Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. But through acquisitions it has also extended beyond Africa to the Americas (Brazil, Argentina and the USA) and to China, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and United Kingdom. 
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itself as a leading agribusiness in inputs, including through a continent-wide license to sell 
John Deere tractors, and the main source of finance and logistics for several farmland 
investments, including in Congo. 
 
In finance, the state has made significant efforts to smooth the path of capital. A month 
before the BRICS Summit in Durban in 2013, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan in his budget 
speech announced the relaxation on foreign exchange controls applying not only to South 
African companies, but also to other companies (especially, as he pointed out, the BRICS) 
who wish to use South Africa as a gateway in view of ‘new opportunities to be seized in 
Africa and other emerging markets’ (Gordhan 2013: 32). These reforms were explicitly 
punted as ‘Gateway to Africa’ reforms. Gordhan noted that the South African Reserve Bank 
‘had approved nearly 1 000 large investments into 36 African countries over the past five 
years’  and that ‘Africa now accounts for about 18 per cent of our total exports, and nearly a 
quarter of our manufactured exports’ (Creamer 2013: 12). 
 
Changes to financial regulation would incentivise investment from and via South Africa by 
creating ‘simpler rules’ to ‘reduce the time and costs of doing business in Africa (Creamer 
2013). By allowing holding companies exempt from the South African Reserve Bank’s 
exchange controls to be created by companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, as 
regional investment vehicles which would not be regarded as resident for exchange-control 
purposes (Louw, cited in Creamer 2013). ‘Similar measures [would] apply to foreign 
companies wanting to invest in African countries using South Africa as their regional 
headquarters… as part of the Gateway to Africa reforms…, including BRIC countries’ 
(Gordhan 2013: 12-13).  
 
Capital is on the move both into and out of South Africa. 
 
Less significant by far is the direct role of state finance through development finance 
institutions (DFIs), with the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) with its massive 
infrastructure projects (in road, rail, energy and mining) and Development Bank of Southern 
Africa, which increasing its loan distribution (in transport, energy, mining, ICT, health, 
financial services and manufacturing), primarily to Zambia and Mozambique (Govender 
2013: 10, 16). 
 
Meanwhile, the Agricultural Business Chamber (ABC 2012) has spearheaded studies on 
agricultural market opportunities in Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Egypt and Kenya, providing 
advice to South African agribusinesses in support of their expansion plans.  
 
4.3. Seed & input supply (pesticide, fertilizer, tractors, etc) 
 
Third is the growing influence of multinational and South African input supply industries. 
 
Then there are the input industries, where the overarching change has been towards 
consolidation in seeds, pesticides and fertilisers, with multinational corporations buying up or 
into South African corporations and these in turn expanding in the region. Examples include 
Pannar (now largely owned by Du Pont), together with Monsanto and Pioneer all but 
monopolising the local market for seed – for maize, sorghum and wheat – while pesticides 
are dominated by a mix of global and local companies – Monsanto, Pioneer, Syngenta and a 
few others, their entry into African agriculture facilitated by the G8’s New Alliance for Food 
Security and Nutrition.  
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4.4. Land deals  
 
Fourth is the prevalence of land deals premised on the expansion of industrial farming 
systems. 
 
‘South African farmers have started to spread their wings considerably wider than the 
traditional South (sic) African Development Community (SADC).’ (AgriSA Africa Policy 
Committee 2014: 35). South African companies are now engaged in forestry deals in 
Mozambique and Ghana, in farming projects in Congo, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Nigeria, and in tourism (wildlife safaris and ecotourism) in Mozambique,  
Tanzania and Uganda (Land Matrix 2015, Serwajja 2014).  
 
Agri South Africa’s ‘Africa Policy Committee’ reports that ‘The international focus on 
agriculture’s potential in Africa has further intensified over the past year, with an increase in 
investments in various high-potential agricultural countries’ (AgriSA Africa Policy 
Committee 2014: 35). In 2013, it created an investment platform named ‘AgriAllAfrica’ 
(AaA) to facilitate South African farmers’ deals in farmland and agriculture elsewhere on the 
continent, and brought state representatives from other African states on visits to South 
Africa to broker deals.  
 
Meanwhile, commercial farmers are forging stronger relations with regional farmer bodies, 
notably the Southern African Commercial Agricultural Union (SACAU) and the new 
continent-wide alliance of regional farmer organisations, the Pan African Farmers’ 
Organization (PAFO). AgriSA’s chief land deal negotiator Theo de Jager is now president of 
both organisations. On his election as president of PAFO last year, he set out priorities for 
African agriculture, including ‘a change of mindset from fighting poverty through 
agriculture, to wealth creation, and a need for Africa to take ownership of opportunities on 
the continent (through intra-Africa trade) (PAFO 2014). 
 
From the gung-ho plans to secure land concessions in 22 African countries in the 2011-2012 
period, though, and after disappointing results of its farmer groups in Mozambique 
(AgriSAMoz) and Congo (Congo Agriculture), AgriSA has withdrawn to more modest aims 
of consolidating its members’ operations in these countries through acquiring ‘priority status’ 
as agricultural investors in these countries, and engaging in talks with these host governments 
to provide further protection and support. It is pursuing immediate opportunities in Ethiopia 
and Nigeria, while continuing to monitor conditions in countries where initial talks have been 
held, including Botswana, Swaziland, Tanzania, Angola, DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, 
South Sudan, Eritrea, Egypt, Chad, Ghana, Gabon and Sierra Leone (AgriSA Africa Policy 
Committee 2014: 39). Meanwhile, at home, it is lobbying the South African government and 
specifically the Ministry of Trade and Industry for support in securing further sites in the face 
of the discontinuation of bilateral investment treaties. 
 
One of the main success stories of South African agribusiness on the continent is that of 
sugar, notably the SA sugar giants: Illovo and Tongaat-Hulett in 6 countries each and, to a 
lesser but growing degree, also TSB, now in 3. Their success builds in large part on the 
export of a model developed and honed over decades in South Africa, of nucleus estates 
supplemented by (indeed, often largely dependent on) contracted outgrowers. The adaptation 
of this model of contract farming, in different ways from Tanzania to Malawi to Zambia to 
Mozambique, shows how these large companies have on the one hand reproduced production 
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systems and labour regimes, and the social relations that underpin them, while also varying 
their modalities. 
 While land deals denote accumulation by dispossession, other factors are also changing landholdings. As Thom Jayne points out endogenous concentration in landholdings in several African countries by local and national elites overshadows ‘land grabs’ – and similarly domestic capitals are moving up and downstream through food value chains. These are highly dynamic contexts into which South African capital, and capital routed via South Africa, is engaging. 
 
4.5. Processing and manufacture 
 
Fifth is the export of South African companies’ food processing, manufacture, logistics and 
distribution operations. Related to the expansion of sugar are the four South African food 
giants – Tiger Brands, Pioneer, Premier and FoodCorp – which dominate processing and 
manufacture in South Africa. 
 
Tiger Brands, the biggest food manufacturer in South Africa, facing declining profits at 
home, has embarked on aggressive acquisitions in other African countries, acquiring Nigerian 
biscuit manufacturer Deli Foods in 2013, as well as a 51 per cent stake in the Ethiopian food 
and beverage East African Group, and 49 per cent of the food and beverage operations of 
UAC of Nigeria Plc. (Africa Business Journal 2014). Meanwhile, its arch-rival at home, 
Pioneer Foods, has also been expanding its Africa operations, having acquired a majority 
stake in Food Concepts PLC, its Nigerian rival in the fast-food and bakery sector, and 
focusing on further expansion of operations in Angola, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Ghana 
(Who’s Who 2015). Pioneer has extended its footprint through vertical integration combined 
with regional expansion, into grains, animal feed, poultry, beverages, until recently through a 
licensing agreement with PepsiCo (Pioneer 2014).  
 
Intimately tied to processing, at the intersection of primary production and retail, is the 
significant transport, logistics and distribution sectors – which we do not deal with here. 
 
4.6. Supermarkets and fast food…. Competing for space with national capital & the 
‘old hubs’ 
Sixth is the rapidly expanding reach of South African food (and non-food) retail, notably 
supermarkets and fast food chains. 
The four giants of food retail in South Africa – Shoprite, Pick n Pay, Spar and Woolworths – 
all have a regional imprint. Shoprite, ‘arguably the most successful supermarket chain in sub-
Saharan Africa’, is at the forefront, with 320 supermarkets (both corporate and franchise) in 
14 African countries, and with rapid expansion both within and beyond these countries 
(Harding 2011). Far behind is Pick n Pay, with its Zimbabwean subsidiary TM, expanding in 
Zambia and Ghana, preparing to move into Nigeria, while closing operations in Mozambique 
and Mauritius (Naidoo 2015), Spar, and Woolworths (which pulled out of Nigeria). Of more 
concern to Shoprite than its South African competitors is the Kenyan supermarket chain 
Nakumatt, and the entry of Walmart into South Africa and its imminent (?) expansion via 
South Africa into the region (Harding 2011). 
Kenya’s Nakumatt supermarket chain now has 35 retail outlets, spanning Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda and Tanzania, taking over Shoprite’s flagship Dar Es Salaam outlet in 2014, and 
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aiming to expand to Burundi ‘to ensure that we fully cover East Africa before setting off on 
the Nakumatt 2.0 journey, which involves registering a Pan-African presence’ with the next 
steps being supermarket expansion in Nigeria, DRC, South Sudan, Malawi and Botswana, 
said managing director of Nakumatt Holdings, Atul Shah (Harding 2011). 
Conclusions 
 
Understanding the link between the internal and regional agro-food transformations means 
we need to look at push and pull factors conditioning the behaviour of capital: 
 Push factors: stagnating demand as an outcome of the accumulation path, featuring 
massive structural unemployment, with capital being pushed to look for new markets. 
 Pull factors: global processes, growing domestic demand for food, including 
manufactured foods ,in Africa’s urban hubs, spurred not only by urbanisation but by oil 
and gas booms and a growing middle class, on the back of decades of post-structural 
adjustment liberalisation. 
 
Globalisation clearly came at a good time for South African capital…. coinciding with the 
end of sanctions, and efforts towards regional integration in Africa, and with the global 
recession and stagnation at home leading to the search for new investment frontiers. 
 
South Africa’s substantial industries across the continent –in the food system but also in 
mining, telecommunications especially MTN, finance, construction, transport and logistics - 
may retain their South African base but, as the example of major brewer SABMiller 
illustrates, many are transnationalising, rebranding for an African market, while providing a 
route through which global capital can partner with South African capital in its African 
expansion. With a Chinese stake in Standard Bank and British Food plc having a majority 
share of Illovo, the notion of South African capital becomes increasingly moot. But the South 
African base, for political, logistical and ideological reasons, is essential for understanding 
how transnational capital is strategising. This exemplifies a ‘capitalist logic’ rather than his 
‘territorial logic’, in Arrighi’s formulation. 
 
But South African capital has also encountered substantial obstacles to entry, and been 
challenged by competition in destination markets, both in and from other middle-income 
countries with expanding agro-food industries of their own. Civil society activists are 
beginning to question capital-centred agro-food systems.  
 
Failure 
 
Success for corporate South Africa as a regional hegemon in Africa’s agro-food system is 
thus far from assured. Which is why we find it instructive to look not only at where South 
African capital has succeeded – in the cases lauded on the popular South African business 
website ‘How we made it in Africa’ – but also to understand the failures, of which there are 
several significant examples: 
 
1. Dangote Flour Mill – Tiger Brands acquired a majority shareholding of 65.7% in DFM 
in 2012 – not profitable and sold one of its subsidiaries which lost nearly a quarter of its 
market value in the year 2013-2014. Also in Nigeria, the demise of Woolworths retail… 
Pioneer, too, is divesting its desperately unprofitable subsidiary Quantum Foods, which 
owns Bokomo Uganda and Bokomo Zambia 
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2. Shoprite in Tanzania – 3 stores in Dar es Salaam and Arusha bought out by Nakumatt in 
2014 (Ciuri 2014) and Woolworths’ withdrawal from Nigeria. 
3. Farmland investments in Congo and Mozambique, with the former being particularly 
disappointing – in Congo, a decline from a plan of 10 million hectares, to agreement on 
200,000 ha, to initial allocaton of 80,000 ha, only a fraction of which has been cultivated, 
and with massive attrition of initial investors, with most returning home, echoing the 
experience of white Zimbabwean farmers who moved into Mozambique after fast-track 
land reform, as documented by Amanda Hammar. 
 
Is the reason for failure in cases such as these the fact that not all elements of the system are 
present? We hypothesise that this is the case. Individual elements (like land deals for primary 
production) depend on the wider system and political support to facilitate the movement of 
big capital through the agrofood system (which the South African state has done). This makes 
corporate investments vulnerable to conditions that differ from those that enabled 
accumulation at home. Capital is also vulnerable, suffering setbacks and losses in the face of 
an absence of the conditions that enabled the development of capitalist agriculture in SA in 
20th century.  
 
We argue, then, that South African capital’s engagement elsewhere on the continent and 
modes of accumulation exhibit a path dependency founded on its MEC and the 
transformations of capitalist agriculture, vertical integration, and the emergence of Big Food 
and Big Retail – even though the ways in which this plays out are contingent, as it encounters 
different conditions and new competitors.  
 
Our preliminary argument, then, is that what is underway is the export of elements of South 
Africa’s agro-food system into countries where states don’t have the capacity or willingness 
to create a capitalist farming class through regulation and subsidy in the way that the 
apartheid government did. It is for this reason that, despite the narrative of ‘Africa rising’ and 
the allure of growing markets that drives expansion, it suffers not only competition from 
other MICs but also setbacks due to the starkly different conditions into which elements of 
South Africa’s agro-food system are inserted. 
 
Research agenda 
 
A research agenda… why, how and outcomes 
 
1. Understand the drivers and mechanisms through which processors precipitate both 
upstream (input industry and primary production) and downstream (retail) 
investments? In other words, who are the key drivers of regional expansion? Led by 
retail rather than production? To what extent has transnationalisation occurred and 
what difference does this make? Does South African-ness still matter in the ways 
capitals are engaged with Africa’s agro-food system? Our view, preliminary as it is, is 
that it does. 
 
2. Explore successes and failures and their reasons – what are the conditions that make 
exporting elements of the South African agro-food system unfeasible? And what are 
the strategic adjustments being made by corporations to spread risk while expanding 
northwards, including, in the face of a limited capital base, integration with global 
capital? For instance, different modalities ranging from merges and acquisitions (in 
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processing and finance) compared to ‘greenfield investments’ in primary production 
and, to a degree, retail.  
 
3. How are ‘host states’ positioning themselves – soliciting inward investment while 
also aiming to shore up local ownership of core sectors in farming, processing and 
retail, and what is the political economy shaping the terms on which outsiders – South 
Africans and others – are allowed to enter into Africa’s agro-food system? And what 
is the political economy of corporate-state relations, social networks and economic 
rent-seeking? 
 
4. Where is the South African state in all this – other than providing a comfortable base 
for global capital, what else is the South African state actively doing to promote 
regional expansion, and how is it balancing this with its interests to provide ‘cheap 
food’ at home to a growing and increasingly unequal population? 
 
5. What are the impacts on local markets and producers – outcomes for agrofood system 
actors and dynamics of accumulation? And what of responses and resistance – the 
politics ‘from below’ – as farmers, workers and civil society contest its promotion of 
capital-centred agro-food systems? 
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